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•TUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER

AND WILLIAM

HALE

GRAND JURY.

Commonwealth v. Harris (Mass.), 121 N. E. 409. Secrecy of proceedings.
Under a plea in abatement it was made to appear that while the cause
was being heard before the grand jury, one or more persons, witnesses in the
-case, were present in the grand jury room while other witnesses were testifying.
Held, that the plea in abatement should have been sustained, the law requiring
that the deliberations of the grand jury be secret. The opinion quotes from
Chief Justice Shaw, as follows:
"The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public
accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public
trial, before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment
of a grand jury, in case of high offenses, is justly regarded as one of the
securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty."
Continuing the court says: "It is manifest an examination of witnesses by
the grand jury in the presence of others, witnesses, bystanders or judges,
necessarily and inevitably subjects the accused to a public trial without right
to testify in his own behalf or to be represented by counsel or attorney. It is
equally plain such procedure destroys the force and vital principle of the oath
which enjoins the grand jury to keep secret the commonwealth's counsel, your
fellow's and your own."
SENTENCE.

People v. Siman (IIl.), 119 N. E. 940. Both fine and imprisomnent imposed under a statute which provided for alternative penalty.
The defendant was sentenced to serve a prison sentence and to pay a fine
of one dollar. He paid the fine and brought habeas corpus proceedings on the
ground that the prison sentence was void. Held, that the prison sentence
was void, when the fine was paid. Carter, J., dissenting.
o See a note in 28 Yale Law Journal 292, approving the dissenting opinion.
VERDICT.

People v. Tananevicz (Ill.), 120 N. E. 766. Rejecting part of verdict as
surplusage,
The defendant was indicted for receiving, as a banker, a deposit while
knowingly insolvent. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and fixed
the punishment at three years' imprisonment in the penitentiary and the payment of a fine of $280. Section 2 of the Parole Act requires an indeterminate
sentence in such cases. The court in passing judgment, however, sentenced,
the defendant to serve an indeterminate term of imprisonment. Held, that the
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portion of the verdict of the jury which lay beyond their legitimate province
was properly rejected as surplusage and the judgment of the court was in
full accord with the remaining and valid part thereof.
BURGLARY.
Sloan v. People, Colo. 176 Pac. 481. Allegation of ownership.
Under the statute, burglary includes the breaking and entering into an
unoccupied as well as occupied dwelling house, thus making it an offense
against property, and not merely against the habitation.
Where an indictment alleged that defendant burglarized the house of
"W.," a conviction was proper on proof that "W.," did not occupy the house,
was the agent for a non-resident owner, his duties consisting in the sale,
renting, and care of the property generally.
CONsTITUTIONAL LAWv.

Intoxicating liquors: Due process.
. . . to keep a
place with the intent of or for the purpose of manufacturing, selling, bartering, giving away, or otherwise furnishing, any spirituous, vinous, fermented or
Proctor v. State, Okla. 176 Pac. 771.

The legislative act making it a crime "for any person

malt liquors, or compounds whatever,

. .

.

"

is condemned by the consti-

tutionaf provisions guaranteeing due process of law and the equal protection
of the law.
A guilty intention, unconnected with an overt act or outward manifestation, cannot be made the subject of punishment under the law.
An unexecuted intent to violate the law amounts to no more than a
thought, and is not punishable as a crime.
DEFENSE OF PROPERTY.

McLean v. Colf, Calif. (Sup. Ct) 176 Pac. 168. Regaining possession.
Where plaintiff seized paper, property of a defendant, she gained only a
momentary custody, rather than its possession, and defendant had right to use
force to protect his possession, or to regain his momentarily interrupted possession.
Defendant's right to use force, particularly as against plaintiff's person,
in defending or recovering momentarily interrupted possession of. a paper,
was limited by condition that force must be no more than reasonably necessary.
In action for assault and battery in attempting to recover paper belonging
to one defendant and taken by plaintiff, evidence held to sustain finding that
amount of force used by defendants was unreasonable, excessive, and violent.
Question whether excessive force has been used by defendants in regaining possession of property momentarily interrupted is one' of fact for trial
court or jury, and, evidence sustaining finding. Supreme Court cannot interfere with conclusion reached.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
State v. Felch, Vt. 105 Atl. 23.
appeal by the state.

Constitutionality of statute authorizing
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Defendant, charged with murder, was acquitted and the state asks for
retrial under Gen. Laws, par. 2598. Held, the statute is constitutional and new
trial ordered for errors prejudicial to the state. After holding that the double,
jeopardy provision of the 5th Amend. to U. S. Constitution does not apply to
state action, and that the statute does not abridge the privileges or immunities
of United States citizenship, the court also holds that a statute authorizing
review by the state, though not limited to determination of legal points, does
not violate the due process clauses of either the State or Federal Constitutions
The opinion of Powers, J., in part, follows: "On considering the constitutionality of the statute, we shall omit reference to statutes merely giving the
prosecution the right of exception to such preliminary rulings as we have
referred to, and shall pay no attention to statutes giving the prosecution the
right of exception to other questions for the sole purpose of settling the law
for future guidance, as decisions under them will afford us no assistance in
the solution of the question here presented. We shall assume, though it has
been doubted (State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110, 27 L. R. A. 498, 48 Am.
St. Rip. 202; United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 12 Sup. Ct. 609, 36 L. Ed.
445), that it was the well-recognized doctrine of the ancient common law that
no man could be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. We are mindful
of the fact that this rule was deemed of such importance that it was given a
place in Magna Charta, and that it was regarded so vital to the maintenance
of the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual liberty that it was made a part of
the Constitution of the United States by the Fifth Amendment, and in one
form or another has found expression in the Constitutions of a majority of
the states of the Union. Under such constitutional provisions it has been
consistently and uniformly held that any legislative attempt to confer upon
the state the right of exceptions for the correction of trial errors was futile.
A statute of California attempted to give the state a right of appeal to the
Supreme Court on all questions of law arising in prosecutions for felonies. In
People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467, it was held that the respondent's acquittal in the
court below was final, and that he could not again be put in jeopardy. A
statute of Illinois attempted to give the complainant a right of appeal in prosecutions for illegal fishing. In People v. Miner, 144 Ill. 308, 33 N. E. 40, 19 L. R. A.
342, it was held that the respondent's acquittal below was a complete protection
from another trial and that the statute was unconstitutional. In West Virginia an ict of the legislature attempted to give the state a right of appeal in
criminal cases, but it was held in Ex parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S. E. 529,
L. R. A. 1915F, 1093, that the act was unconstitutional.
By the provisions of a certain military order regularly promulgated for
the government of the Philippine Islands, the right of the government to appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a court of first instance was recognized.
But in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 49 L, Ed. 114,
1 Ann. Cas. 655, it was held that this was -repugnant to a provision that no
person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment, contained in an act of Congress, subsequently passed for the administration of the
affairs of the Islands, and was repealed by it. Though the question was not
directly involved, it was said in State v. Hart,90 N. J. Law, 261, 101 Atl. 278,
L. R. A. 1917F, 985, that "it is clear that it is not within the constitutional
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power of legislative authority to confer by statute" upon the state the right
of exception in criminal cases.
The foregoing views seem to be accepted as sound by one or two other
cases not now at hand and are generally approved by text-writers and commentators. However, the theory that the jeopardy involved is single and continuous until a result is reached that is free from error is not without its
defenders. See State v. Lee, supra, and dissenting opinion by Holmes, J.,
in Kepner v. United States, supra."
"It is interesting to note in this connection that the question whether double
jeopardy amounts to want of due 'process under the Federal Constitution was
suggested and its importance recognized by Mr. Justice Harlan in Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U. S.71, 23 Sup. Ct. 28, 47 L. Ed. 79, but was left undecided. It is
also of interest to note that in Ex parte Ulrich (D. C.) 42 Fed. 587, it was
held by Judge Philips that, inasmuch as it is a principle of the common law
that no one shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, the trial
and commitment of one who has already been partly tried and in legal effect
acquitted of the same offense is depriving him of his liberty without due
process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of that
decision, whatever else might be said, it is enough now to say that it was put
wholly on common-law grounds, no statutory provision being involved, it arose
in a state whose constitution contains a provision against double jeopardy, and
it is predicated upon a view of legal jeopardy wholly at variance with that
of this court as expressed in State v. Champeau, 52 Vt. 313, 36 Am. Rep. 754
The case in band does not require a discussion of the true meaning of the
term "jeopardy," as used in the cases hereinbefore referred to. They were
decided under provisions, either constitutional or statutory, expressly prohibiting a second jeopardy for the same offense. Our own constitution contains no such provision. If the statute in question conflicts with any of its
provisions, it is with the one contained in this clause of the tenth article of the
Bill of Rights:
"Nor can any person be justly deprived of his liberty, except by the laws
of the land."
So it remains to consider whether the statute violates this provision or
the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
We have not far to look for a satisfactory and authoritative interpretation of our constitutional provision, for it received the painstaking attention
of Judge Rowell in State v. Stimpson, 78 Vt. 124, 62 Atl. 14, 1 L. R. A. (N S.)
1153, 6 Ann. Cas. 639. It was claimed in that case that this provision required
prosecutions for common-law felonies to be by indictment, since, as the phrase
in question was used in Magna Charta, it so required by the settled judicial
construction in England prior to the adoption of our constitution; and that,
when we took the phrase, we took the construction with it. It was held
otherwise, however, and the true meaning of the expression "the law of the
land," and its legal equivalent "due process of law," was fully considered and
discussed, and the conclusion was reached that the law of the land was not
beyond the reach of the legislature, that it varies from time to time according
to legislative fiat, and that any statute otherwise valid that leaves unimpaired
the fundamentals of individual rights of life, liberty, and property is not
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inconsistent therewith. And this is in entire accord with the holding of the
Federal Supreme Court already referred to. The question before us, then,
comes to this: Does this statute affect the respondent's fundamental rights?
That it violates the rules of the ancient common law, that it infringes rights
specified in Magna Charta, that it revises the policy of the state in criminal
matters, and imparts something of a shock to a mind trained in the common
law-these considerations are not controlling.
Due process of law-the law of the land-is not immutable. It changes
from time to time. What due process requires in New Hampshire may not
be necessary in Vermont. It is a matter of legislation, provided, always, that
express constitutional provisions and the fundamental rights referred to are
not infringed or impaired. Brownt v. New Jersey, 175 U. S.175, 20 Sup. Ct. 77,
44 L. Ed. 119.
To determine just what those fundamental rights are-to enumerate or
define them-would be a matter of some difficulty. It has never been attempted, and will not be now. State v. Stimpson, supra, shows that a presentment by indictment is not one; and Brom v. New Jersey, supra, shows that
trial by jury even is not one. Of course we are now speaking of what due
process requires, and leave out of consideration express constitutional requirements.
We now hold that relief from the vexation of a second trial is not one,
and that the constitutional provisions under discussion are not infringed by
the statute in question. This view is indirectly approved in Ex parte Bornee,
supra, wherein attention is called to the fact that the Constitution of Virginia
(which in this respect is like our own) does not prevent the passage of an
act granting the state the right of appeal in criminal cases."
Commonwealth v. Perrow, Va. 97 S. E. 820.
ment.

Right of appeal by govern-

Under Const., Sec. 8, alloNiring appeal to commonwealth in prosecutions
for violation of a state revenue law, when commonwealth seeks reversal and
new trial, as distinguished from decision of legal questions for use as precedent, rule against second jeopardy, proprio vigore destroys right of appeal, and
accused need not abide result of appeal, and then resort to plea of autrefois
acquit or autrefois convict.
Under Const., Sec. 8, and section 88, as to second jeopardy, legislature
may allow commonwealth appeal in any criminal case involving revenue law,
regardless of degree of punishment.
While "jeopardy," as ordinarily understood in legal parlance, refers to
danger of conviction and punishment which accused incurs in a criminal case,
where a jury has been impaneled and sworn, the spirit of the constitution extends its meaning to any discharge upon a defense constituting a bar to the
prosecution.
Violation of Acts 1899-1900, c. 806, imposing penalty for soliciting men
to leave Buckingham county, without securing a license as a labor agent, is
not a violation of a state revenue law, and therefore commonwealth cannot, in
view of Const., Sec. 8, and Code, 1904, Sec. 4052, appeal, under Const., Sec'. 88,
from a judgment of a justice of the peace, quashing warrant on ground that
such act is unconstitutional.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS
GAMING.

State v. John'son, Okla. 177 Pac. 926. Slot machine.
A slot machine which delivers an article, the sale price of which is the
coin deposited in the machine, and in addition thereto sometimes delivers certain trade checks, ranging in quantity and value from 2 to 20 times the value
of the coin deposited, and also indicates before each play what the machine
will deliver on that particular play, but does not indicate what will be
delivered on any subsequent play, is prohibited from being set up and operated
in a place of business, under sections 4 each of chapter 128, Session Laws,
1913, and chapter 26, Session Laws, 1916.
INDETERMINATE

SENTENCE.

Ex parte Lee, Calif. 171 Pac. 958. Constitutionality.
Pen. Code, see. 1168, providing for indeterminate sentences in offenses
punishable by imprisonment in a reformatory or in a state prison, and giving
the reformatory or prison authorities power to determine after expiration
of the minimum term what length of time such prisoner shall be confined, does
not violate Const., art. 3, sec. 1, providing for the division of the state into the
executive, legislative, and judicial departments, and prohibiting the exercise of
the powers of one department by either of the others; such act constituting
neither a delegation of legislative nor judicial functions.
Such provision is ex post facto as to a person convicted for a crime
committed prior to its enactment, since it substitutes the discretion of the
board of prison directors for the statutory right formerly existing to credits
for good behavior during impisonment.
INDICTMENT.

Stewart v. State, Ga. 97 S.E. 871. Variance.
Where defendant is indicted for the larceny of an automobile, the charge
in detail being that he did take and carry away with intent to steal, etc., "one
seven-passenger automobile Overland" of a certain designated number and
model, and the evidence showing that the automobile was a "seven-passenger
Willys-Overland" of the same number and model as alleged in the indictment,
the description in the evidence conforming in every detail with that contained
in the indictment, except that the indictment alleges "Overland" when the proof
shows the automobile to have been a "Willys-Overland," there is no such
variance between the charge and the proof as would amount to a failure of
the evidence to sustain the charge set out in the indictment. In the absence
of proof that an "Overland" and a "Willys-Overland" are separate and distinct types of automobiles, the word "Overland" will be taken as generic and
generally descriptive of a certain type of automobile, and the word "Willys"
will be taken as an adjective describing specifically a particular species of
automobile. It follows therefore that, where an indictment alleges generally
that the automobile stolen was an "Overland" of a certain number and model
this allegation is sustained by evidence to the effect that the automobile claimed
to have been stolen was a particular kind of Overland, such as a "WillysOverland."
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JUVENILE COURT.

Ex parte Songer, Colo. 177 Pac. 141. Jurisdiction: rape.
The Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction of prosecution of an adult for
rape, under Laws, 1907, p. 324, limiting jurisdiction to criminal cases "in which
the disposition, custody or control of any child or minor, or any other person, may be involved under the acts concerning delinquent, dependent or
neglected children, or any other acts, statute or law of this state, now or
hereafter existing, concerning dependent, delinquent or neglected children, or
which may in any manner concern or relate to the person, liberty, protection, correction, morality, control, adoption or disposition of any infant,
child, or minor, or the duties to, or responsibility for such infant, child or
minor, or any parent, guardian.or of any other person, corporation or institution whatsoever."
Scott and Allen, JJ., dissenting.
LARCENY.
State v. Fitzsimmons, Dela. 104 At.
diamonds.

834.

Larceny by trick: Switching

Where defendant, offered three unset diamonds for sale, took prospective
customer to jeweler who tested and found diamonds to be genuine, refused
to sell at purchaser's price, and after having left purchaser substituted glass
stones for the diamonds, and returned and sold stones as though they were
the ones previously tested, he was guilty of larceny by trick.
NON-SUPPORT.
State v. Langford, Ore. 176 Pac. 197.
Oregon Laws, 1917, p. 175, making it an offense for any person without
just or sufficient cause to fail to support his children construed. Held: (1)
the duty of support imposed by this statute is not impaired by a decree of
divorce, awarding custody of a minor child to the mother; (2) the father's
duty remains primary despite L. 0. L., sec. 7039, etc., relating to the duty of
both parents to support their children; (3) that a wife has means of her
own and supports the child is no defense to the father under Laws, 1917, p.
175; (4) nor i remarriage of the mother a defens6; (5) but where the
father also remarried before the passage of the 1917 law, held he has a
defense by showing that he ii unable to support his second wife, much less
the child.
SENTENCE.
State v. Piper, kans. 176 Pac. 626.
Three persons pleaded guilty to violations of the prohibitory law before
a justice of the peace, and were sentenced to jail and to pay fines and costs.
Later the justice paroled the defendants and remitted the jail sentences when
the fines and costs were paid. The justice of the peace resigned and his
successor issued commitments for their incarceration. The probate judge discharged them on writs of habeas corpus. Held, that the justice of the peace
was without jurisdiction to parole or remit the jail sentences, and that the
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probate judge had no jurisdiction to discharge the convicted persons from the
custody of the sheriff, who held them under the commitments for the terms
of imprisonment which had been executed; and held, also, that mandamus
should issue to secure the execution of the juagments originally imposed.
SENTENCE.

Ex parte Germino, Calif. 176 Pac. 701. Re-sentence.
Although the provisions of Pen. Code, Section 1191, fixing the time for
the passing of sentence after verdict of guilty in a criminal case, are mandatory, they do not apply to a judgment merely irregular in form, and, where
a prisoner has been erroneously sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, for a crime committed prior to its passage, he may be re-sentenced under
the previous law, although the time limited by the statute has elapsed.
STATUTES.

State v. Blaisdell, Me. 105 Atl. 359. Construing penal statute; "corrupting"
spring.
One who stirs up and roils the water of a spring by digging into the
mud with a stick, does not "corrupt" or "defile" the water within the meaning
of Rev. St., c. 130, sec. 1, as amended by Laws, 1917, c. 126.
Penal statutes are strictly construed, but a statute declaring an act to be
a felony calls for a more strict construction than one which declares an act
to be a misdemeanor.
TRIAL.
In re Smith, N. Mex. 176 Pac. 819. Insanity after conviction.
Chapter 70, Code, 1915, which 6rovides for the issuance by a district judge
of a commission in the nature of a writ de lunatico inquiriendo to inquire
into the lunacy or habitual drunkenness of any person within this state, or
having real or personal estate therein, has no application to a person in
the custody of the law awaiting execution for a capital offense or to a convict undergoing imprisonment for crime. Said statute was enacted solely
for the purpose of protecting the civil and property rights of insane persons
and habitual drunkards and for the care of indigent persons by the various
counties. Hence an adjudication by a district court under such statute that
a person who has been tried and convicted for the crime of murder and
sentenced to death is a person of unsound mind is void, and does not have the
effect to stay the execution.
The common law forbids the trial, sentencing, or execution of an insane
person for a crime while he continues in that state. Where a person has been
convicted of a crime and sentenced to death, and, pending the execution, a
suggestion is made to the court, so passing sentence that the accused has become insane, and the court is satisfied from such suggestion that there is a
question as to the sanity of such party, the court will, as a matter of humanity,
make such investigation as may be necessary to become informed as to the
sanity or insanity of such party.
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TRIAL.

State v. Warm, Vt. 105 Atl. 244. New trial: juror betting on result of
trial.
Public policy will not permit verdicts to stand which are rendered by jurymen who bet on the issue, be the stake great or small.
On a petition to the Supreme Court for a new trial by one convicted of
manslaughter, based on disqualification of a juror in having wagered on the
result of the trial, affidavits held to show that the juror had in fact made
such wager.
TRIAL.

State v. Craig, N. Car. 97 S. E. 400. Procedure where defendant acquitted
on ground of insanity.
Revisal, 1905, sec 4618 (a part of chapter 97, sub-chapter 7), providing
that when a person accused of murder, rape, etc., "or other crimes," shall
be acquitted upon ground of insanity, the court shall detain such person until
an inquisition shall be had, does not apply to the crime of resisting an officer;
the quoted words meaning crimes of like kind and grade as those enumerated.
That verdict of not guilty of resisting an officer was based upon belief
that defendant did not have sufficient mental capacity to commit a crime did
not authorize trial court to make an order inquiring into his mental condition with a view of having him confined in the department of "dangerous
insane," in the penitentiary, pursuant to Revisal, 1905, sec. 4618.
VERDICT.

Autrey v. State, Ga. 97 S. E. 753. Uncertain verdict.
Upon a trial under an indictment for assault with intent to murder, alleged
to have been committed by shooting another with a pistol, a verdict finding the
defendant "guilty of shooting a man" is not void for uncertainty. Its reasonable intendment and meaning is that the defendant was' guilty of the offense
of shooting at another, not in his own defense, nor under other circumstances
of justification.

